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TORT LAW-EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAPABLE OF HEALING 
ITSELF IS AN INSUFFICIENT INJURY FOR A CLAIM OF IN-
TENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS THAT DOES NOT CAUSE PHYSICAL 
INJURY CAPABLE OF OBJECTIVE DETERMINATION IS AN 
INSUFFICIENT INJURY FOR A CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE. 
Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057, cert. 
denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986). 
A mother and daughter purchased a truck from a dealer who as-
signed the installment contract to a credit company. 1 After several pay-
ments were made, the mother became preoccupied with her terminally ill 
husband, and the daughter became unable to work full time because of 
injuries suffered in a car accident.2 The installment payments became 
overdue, and a representative of the credit company began telephoning 
the mother in a rude and hostile manner, on one occasion as late as 10:00 
in the evening.3 During these conversations, the representative 
threatened to sue the mother, ruin her credit, and referred to her daugh-
ter as a liar. As a consequence, the mother suffered extreme agitation 
and experienced difficulty sleeping. 4 
After the credit company repossessed the truck, the mother and 
daughter visited the credit company's office to reinstate the installment 
contract-S While at the credit company's office, the mother asked to 
speak with the representative who had been telephoning her.6 In re-
sponse, the representative shouted from another room that he wanted 
nothing to do with herJ The mother became so embarrassed that "[she] 
could have cried."8 Subsequently, in contravention of the sales contract, 
the credit company rejected the offer to reinstate the contract.9 
The mother and daughter brought suit against the credit company 
and its representative for, inter alia, 10 intentional infliction of emotional 
1. Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 51, 502 A.2d 1057, 1059-60, 
cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986). 
2. /d. at 51-52, 502 A.2d at 1060. 
3. /d. at 52, 502 A.2d at 1060. 
4. /d. at 52-53, 502 A.2d at 1060. For several years, the mother also suffered urinary 
incontinence causing her to get up several times each night. /d. at 53, 502 A.2d at 
1060. 
5. /d. at 55, 502 A.2d at 1060-61. 
6. /d. at 55, 502 A.2d at 1061. 
7. Record Extract at 296, Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 502 
A.2d 1057, cert. denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986). 
8. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 55, 502 A.2d at 1061. 
9. /d. at 55, 502 A.2d at 1062. The credit company erroneously applied Florida law 
which permitted reinstatement of the installment contact only if the balance was 
paid in full. /d. 
10. /d. at 55-56, 502 A.2d at 1062. The amended complaint included six counts: 
1) conversion by wrongful deprivation of the truck; 2) conversion by wrongful re-
tention of the truck; 3) violation of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act; 
4) breach of contract by failure to return the truck and reinstate the conditional 
sales agreement; 5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and 6) negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress. 
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distress 11 and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 12 The Circuit 
Court of Maryland for Baltimore County dismissed the claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress 13 and granted the defendant's mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 14 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland affi.rmed. 15 
According to the majority view, 16 which has adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, 17 the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress includes four elements: 1) the defendant's act is intentional or 
reckless; 2) the defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous; 3) the 
defendant's conduct causes the plaintiff's emotional distress; and 4) the 
plaintiffs emotional distress is severe. Maryland follows the majority 
view in requiring that each of these four elements coalesce before liability 
is imposed. 18 
The first element of the tort is satisfied if the defendant desires to 
inflict severe emotional distress. This desire is indicated where the de-
fendant knows that such distress is substantially certain to result from his 
conduct, or where he acts recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high 
degree of probability that such distress will follow. 19 Despite the charac-
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also W. PROSSER & W. 
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS§ 12 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROS-
SER & KEETON). 
12. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916; 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. 
Rptr. 831 (1980); Rodriguez v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970); Culbert v. 
Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 
S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1972). See also 
Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Conse-
quences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d Later 
Case Service 100, § 8.5 (1984); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at 359-67. 
13. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 56, 502 A.2d at 1062. 
14. Id. The award of punitive damages for the conversion claim, however, was left 
undisturbed. Id. at 57, 502 A.2d at 1062. 
15. /d. at 68, 502 A.2d at 1068. The trial court's decision which allowed the claim of 
punitive damages for conversion to go to the jury was affirmed because the defend-
ant's conduct evidenced actual malice. Id. at 65-66, 502 A.2d at 1067. For a discus-
sion of actual malice in the context of an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cause of action, see infra notes 22 & 52. 
16. See Annotation, Modem Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as In-
dependant Tort: "Outrage," 38 A.L.R.4th 998 § 3 (1985). 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 461 (1965) states: 
I d. 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
bodily harm. 
18. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977); see generally Case 
Comment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: A New Tort for Maryland -
Harris v. Jones, 38 MD. L. REV. 366 (1978). 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment i (1965). Black's Law Diction-
ary defines recklessness as: 
The state of mind accompanying an act, which either pays no regard to its 
probably or possibly injurious consequences, or which, though foreseeing 
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terization of the tort as the intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
Maryland follows the majority view in permitting an action where the 
defendant's act is either intentional or reckless. 20 
Whether the defendant's act is intentional or reckless, his conduct 
also must be extreme and outrageous. Such conduct is defined as "con-
duct ... so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious 
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."21 In determining 
whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, proof of a malicious intent 
alone is insufficient. 22 Several factors are considered relevant: whether 
such consequences, persists in spite of such knowledge. Recklessness is a 
stronger term than mere or ordinary negligence, and to be reckless, the 
conduct must be such as to evince disregard of or indifference to conse-
quences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety of others, 
although no harm was intended. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1142-43 (5th ed. 1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). 
20. See Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 139-40, 396 A.2d 296, 302 (allowing cause of 
action when emotional distress is caused by reckless conduct), aff'd in part and 
rev'd in part, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979). 
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965); see also Harris V. 
Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)). 
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965) states in part: 
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which 
is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict the emotional 
distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by 'malice,' or a 
degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages 
for another tort. 
I d. Therefore, actual malice is not an element of the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See infra note 52. It may be, however, the basis of punitive 
damages in a tort action arising out of a contractual relationship. American Laun-
dry Mach. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 115, 412 A.2d 407, 419 (1980). Proof of 
extreme and outrageous conduct and proof of actual malice have different legal pur-
poses. Proof of extreme and outrageous conduct permits compensation for emo-
tional distress and ensures that the distress is genuine and substantial. LaFleur by 
Blackey v. Mosher, 109 Wis. 2d 112, 117, 325 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1982); see 2 F. 
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, LAW OF TORTS§ 9.1, at 610 n.32 (2d ed. 1986) 
[hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY]. Proof of actual malice, however, permits 
punitive damages as a deterrent against evil behavior in a contractual setting. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment a (1979) ("Conduct that is 
outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the 
rights of others."). The Court of Appeals of Maryland has defined narrowly actual 
malice as "the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse, but with 
an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and 
wilfully injure the plaintiff." H. & R. Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 43, 338 
A.2d 48, 52 (1975). Eg., Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1969) 
(threatening a sister into refraining from selling her shares in jointly owned stock); 
McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961) (forcing 
a buyer to release all claims as a condition of redemption on a contract which al-
ready had been assigned); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (threat-
ening an employee with legal action for refusing a polygraph test despite knowledge 
that the employee had a statutory right to make the refusal), cert. denied, 304 Md. 
631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). The majority of states have adopted the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, but the more narrow definition set forth in Testerman is the stan-
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the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emotional distress,23 whether 
the defendant knew that the plaintiff was particularly susceptible to emo-
tional distress,24 and whether the defendant's relationship with the plain-
tiff gave the defendant actual or apparent authority over the plaintiff or 
power to affect the plaintiff's interest.25 In Maryland, the relevancy of 
the defendant-plaintiff relationship becomes more significant when the 
dard applied in Maryland. American Laundry, 45 Md. App. at Ill n.4, 412 A.2d at 
416 n.4. 
23. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MicH. L. REv. 
874, 887-88 (1939) ("There is a difference between violent and vile profanity ad-
dressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte miner and a United States 
marine."). For an interpretation of this wording by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, see Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 140 n.ll, 396 A.2d 296, 302 n.11, 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979). 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment f (1965) states in part: 
The extreme and outragoues character of the conduct may arise from the 
actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional dis-
tress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The 
conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor 
proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did 
not know. It must be emphasized again, however, that major outrage is 
essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other 
will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not 
enough. 
Id. See, e.g., Bundren v. Superior Court of Venture, 145 Cal. App. 3d 784, 193 Cal. 
Rptr. 671 (1983) (dunning of patient still feeling effects of surgery by hospital 
employees). 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment e (1965) states: 
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from 
an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which 
gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect 
his interests. Thus an attempt to extort money by a threat of arrest may 
make the actor liable even where the arrest, or the threat alone, would not 
do so. In particular police officers, school authorities, landlords, and col-
lecting creditors have been held liable for extreme abuse of their position. 
Even in such cases, however, the actor has not been held liable for mere 
insults, indignities, or annoyances that are not extreme or outrageous. 
Id. Professors Prosser and Keeton have discussed the problem arising from the 
heavy handed efforts of creditors to collect debts: 
The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may arise not so much 
from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some relation or 
position which gives the defendant actual or apparent power to damage 
the plaintiff's interests .... 
It is on this basis that the tort action has been used as a potent 
counter-weapon against the more outrageous high-pressure methods of 
collection agencies and other creditors. These are sufficiently well known, 
ranging from violent cursing, abuse, and accusations of dishonesty, 
through a series of ... telephone calls around the clock, or attempts to pile 
up the pressure by involving the plaintiff's employer, relatives, or neigh-
. bors ... in the controversy . . . . It is seldom that any one such item of 
conduct is found alone in a case; and the liability usually has rested on a 
prolonged course· of hounding by a variety of extreme methods. 
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at 61-62 (footnotes omitted). For a statutory 
definition of wrongful conduct by a creditor in Maryland, see Maryland Consumer 
Debt Collection Act. Mo. CON. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-201 to 14-204 (1975). 
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plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of a 
mental condition. 26 
The third element of the tort is a fact-finding matter; the trier of fact 
must determine whether the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's 
injury. The fourth element - "severe" emotional distress-however, 
has led to judicial attempts at definition.27 Although the emotional dis-
tress need not result in a physical injury,28 it must be so severe that no 
reasonable man could be expected to endure it. 29 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts states, "Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attaina-
ble in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional 
26. Compare Young v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 
(1985) (recovery allowed where employer required a psychiatric examination only 
to harass an emotionally disturbed employee into either suicide or abandoning her 
claim for worker's compensation); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. l, 494 A.2d 212 
(recovery allowed where employer transferred a dedicated, middle-aged employee 
with a preexisting nervous disorder, reduced her hours, and took her company keys 
because she refused to take a polygraph test), cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 
649 (1985) with Leese v. Baltimore, 64 Md. App. 442, 497 A.2d 159 (recovery de-
nied where employer denied an employee a full-time position by virtue of a sham 
interview and fired him because of personal bias), cert. denied, 305 Md. 106, 501 
A.2d 845 (1985); Dick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 63 Md. App. 270, 
492 A.2d 674 (1985) (recovery denied where creditor shouted angrily and 
threatened to attach a debtor's home and wages, demanded cash, and accused the 
debtor of lying); Beye v. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 59 Md. App. 642, 477 A.2d 1197 
(recovery denied where employer gave an employee a low evaluation, passed over 
him to promote those less qualified, appointed as his supervisor the same man he 
attempted to have prosecuted, and deceived the employee into resigning), cert. de-
nied, 301 Md. 639, 484 A.2d 274 (1984); Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 52 
Md. App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176 (1982) (recovery denied where employer gave an 
employee a low evaluation, moved him from desk to desk, hummed and made faces 
at him, screamed at him to move from a certain desk, pushed him, and tapped him 
on the nose). 
27. The Supreme Court of Illinois stated: 
It has been suggested that not ... every emotional upset should constitute 
the basis of an action. Indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental 
anguish would encourage neurotic overreactions to trivial hurts, and the 
law should aim to toughen the psyche of the citizen rather than pamper it. 
But a line can be drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a 
complex society and the severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional 
action's wholly lacking in social utility. 
Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 85, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (1961) (quoting Magruder, 
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 
1035 (1936)). 
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment k (1965) states in part: 
[I]f the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous there may be liabil-
ity for the emotional distress alone, without [bodily] harm. In such cases 
the courts may perhaps tend to look for more in the way of outrage as a 
guarantee that the claim is genuine; but if the enormity of the outrage 
carries conviction that there has in fact been severe emotional distress, 
bodily harm is not required. 
I d. 
29. Moniodis, 64 Md. App. at 15, 494 A.2d at 219 ("Where the extreme and outrageous 
conduct by the defendant is proven, this may be 'important evidence that the dis-
tress has existed'.") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j 
(1965)), cert. denied, 304 Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
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distress is a part of the price of living among people."30 In determining 
whether emotional distress is severe, proof of a peculiar susceptibility to 
emotional distress is relevant, but not determinative. 31 Other factors 
considered relevant include the intensity32 and duration33 of the emo-
tional distress. In Maryland, the relevancy of the duration of the emo-
tional distress becomes more significant when the plaintiff is "unable to 
function or tend to necessary matters."34 
According to the majority view,35 which has adopted the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts,36 negligent infliction of emotional distress is not 
an independent tort. There is no duty to refrain from negligent conduct 
if it only inflicts emotional distress that fails to produce bodily reactions 
resulting in physical injury.37 Recovery for emotional distress alone is 
denied because the plaintiff's injury is not sufficiently severe to permit 
burdening the court with a lawsuit, the plaintiff's testimony is not suffi-
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment j (1965). 
31. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965) states in part, "The 
distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no 
liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional 
distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the 
actor has knowledge." ld.; see also Moniodis, 64 Md. App. at 16, 494 A.2d at 219; 
cf supra text accompanying note 24 (plaintiff's particular susceptibility to emo-
tional distress is relevant in determining whether the defendant's conduct is extreme 
and outrageous). 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 46 comment j (1965). 
33. Jd. 
34. Leese v. Baltimore, 64 Md. App. 442, 471, 497 A.2d 159, 174 (quoting Moniodis, 64 
Md. App. at 16, 494 A.2d at 219), cert. denied, 305 .Md. 106, 501 A.2d 845 (1985). 
Compare Moniodis, 64 Md. App. at 16, 494 A.2d at 219-20 (emotional distress was 
sufficiently severe where employee became reclusive and was no longer able to per-
form household chores); Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 137, 396 A.2d 296, 301 
(emotional distress was sufficiently severe where wife suffered "nervousness, sponta-
neous crying, hollowed appearance, and an inability to relate to the present"), aff'd 
in part and rev'd in part, 286 Md. 490,408 A.2d 728 (1979) with Harris v. Jones, 281 
Md. 560, 572-73, 380 A.2d 611, 617 (1977) (emotional distress was insufficiently 
severe where employee suffered humiliations, aggravatation of nervous condition 
and speech impediment, and felt "like going into a hole to hide"); Moniodis, 64 Md. 
App. at 15, 494 A.2d at 219 (emotional distress was insufficiently severe where em-
ployee suffered increased smoking, lost sleep, and hives); Leese, 64 Md. App. at 472, 
497 A.2d at 174 (emotional distress was insufficiently severe where employee suf-
fered physical pain and great mental anguish). 
35. E.g., Payton v. Abbot Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Falzone v. 
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965). See Annotation, Right to Recover for Emo-
tional Disturbance or its Physical Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other 
Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 100, § 7(a) (1984). 
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 436A (1965) states, "If the actor's conduct is 
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emo-
tional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, 
without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such 
emotional disturbance." Id. 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment a (1965). See Vance v. 
Vance, 286 Md. 490, 501 n.4, 408 A.2d 728, 734 n.4 (1979). There are two possible 
exceptions: ( 1) the negligent transmission of messages, especially those announcing 
death by telegraph companies; and (2) the negligent mishandling of corpses. PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 11, at 362. 
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ciently corroborated to avoid fraudulent claims, or the defendant's con-
duct is not sufficiently culpable to permit liability for purely emotional 
injury.38 Maryland follows the majority view in denying an action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.39 
Nevertheless, there is liability for negligent conduct that inflicts 
emotional distress if the emotional distress in fact produces bodily reac-
tions resulting in physical injury. The physical injury provides the requi-
site evidence necessary for an ordinary negligence action. 40 The 
emotional distress is not the basis for recovery, but rather an additional 
factor considered in measuring damages.41 
Despite the characterization of the tort as negligence, an action is 
permitted where the defendant's act was intentional provided the conse-
quential injury suffered by the plaintiff was unintentional.42 If the de-
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 436A comment b (1965). 
39. Vance, 286 Md. at 501 n.4, 408 A.2d at 734 n.4. But see Hearst Corps. v. Hughs, 
297 Md. 112, 145,466 A.2d 486, 502-03 (1983) (Davidson, J., dissenting); Hunter v. 
Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481, 495, 439 A.2d 582, 589 
(1982) (Davidson, J., concurring and dissenting); McCance v. Lindau, 63 Md. App. 
504, 513,492 A.2d 1352, 1357 (1985). Only six months before Hamilton, the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland stated, "What the trial court characterizes as a 
restatement of a claim for assault, we perceive to be a claim for the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress- inartfully worded, but legally sufficient." McCance, 63 
Md. App. at 513, 492 A.2d at 1357. 
40. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965). 
41. /d. § 47 comment b (1965). An individual's interest in emotional well-being is given 
only partial legal protection. If the sole effect of the negligent conduct is to cause 
emotional distress, the plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against the de-
fendant. If the defendant's conduct causes other recoverable damage, however, the 
emotional distress can be attached as an additional element of damages. I d.; see also 
Patapsco Loan Co. v. Hobbs, 129 Md. 9, 98 A. 239 (1916) (trespass); see generally 
Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40 (1956). 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 312, 436A(l) (1965); see McCance, 63 Md. 
App. at 513-14, 492 A.2d at 1357-58 (citing Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 52 Md. App. 
31, 447 A.2d 84, cen. denied, 294 Md. 543 (1982)). 
Negligence based upon emotional distress also may arise from an unintentional 
act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 313, 436(2)-(3) (1965). Where the 
plaintiff by chance escapes foreseeable physical impact, but the threat of that physi-
cal impact causes emotional distress that produces a physical injury, the uninten-
tional act has caused an unintentional, but foreseeable physical injury. Id. § 437 
comment b. 
A minority of judges on the Court of Appeals of Maryland have confused the 
difference between negligence based upon emotional distress arising from an inten-
tional and an unintentional act. The majority of the court of appeals has held that, 
where the defendant intentionally threatened the plaintiff's emotional well-being, 
proof that the plaintiff was within the physical zone of danger is unnecessary. See 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931) (the 
plaintiff fainted after receiving a package that appeared to be a loaf of bread, but 
contained a dead rat). The majority of the court of appeals also has held that, where 
the defendant unintentionally threatened the plaintiff's emotional well-being, proof 
that the plaintif was within the physical zone of danger is necessary. Bowman v. 
Williams, 164 Md. 397, 402, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933) (while on the first floor of his 
home, a father saw a truck crash into the basement where his children were playing, 
and recovered because he was within the physical zone of danger); Resavage v. Da-
vies, 199 Md. 479, 487, 86 A.2d 879, 883 (1951) (while standing on her front porch, 
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fendant intentionally subjects the plaintiff to emotional distress that a 
reasonable man would foresee as likely to result in a physical injury, the 
intentional act has resulted in an unintentional, but actionable physical 
injury.43 In determining whether conduct is negligent, proof that the 
plaintiff suffered a physical impact44 or feared for his physical safety,45 
or that the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous46 is unnec-
essary. In Maryland, however, this type of negligence resembles conduct 
considered extreme and outrageous. 47 
Under a negligence action, the severity and genuineness of the emo-
tional distress is corroborated by the consequential physical injury. In 
a mother saw an automobile jump a curb and kill her two daughters, but could not 
recover because she was outside the physical zone of danger); cf State, Use of Aro· 
noff v. Baltimore Transit Co., 197 Md. 528, 80 A.2d 13 (1951) (fear for one's per· 
sonal property was insufficient where plaintiff was outside the physical zone of 
danger); see generally Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Develop-
ments in the Law, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 135, 143-51 (1984). Nevertheless, in 
Resavage, the dissent misconstrued Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. to suggest that, 
where the defendant unintentionally threatened the plaintiff's emotional well-being, 
proof that the plaintiff was within the physical zone of danger is unnecessary. 
Resavage, 199 Md. at 495-97, 86 A.2d at 887 (Delaplaine & Markell, J.J., 
dissenting). 
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(1) (1965) states: 
/d. 
If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to 
protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the 
actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, 
the fact that the harm results solely through the internal operation of the 
fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from 
liability. 
44. See Green v. T.A. Shoemaker, Ill Md. 69, 80-81, 73 A. 688, 692 (1909). 
45. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 436 comments a-c (1965); see Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co., 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22. 
46. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 312 comment b (1965). 
47. Compare cases involving negligence: Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 
(1979) (a husband left his wife and two children for another woman after 18 years of 
marriage; thereafter, the wife obtained a decree for alimony and child support, but 
the husband filed a motion to strike the decree and annul the marriage on the 
ground that their marriage was void because he was not divorced from his first wife 
at the time he married his present wife); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 
923 (1951) (a young child's father fatally shot her mother in her presence and con· 
fined her in the same room with the corpse for six days; thereafter, the child's father 
committed suicide in her presence and, in the process, drenched her in his blood); 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (a dead rat was mistakenly 
packaged as a loaf of bread and delivered to a nervous woman); McCance v. Lindau, 
63 Md. App. 504, 492 A.2d 1352 (1985) (an attempt to personally serve notice of 
process on a woman resulted in a high speed car chase which included bumping 
cars); with cases involving extreme and outrageous conduct: Young v. Hartford 
Accident & lndem. Co., 303 Md. 182, 492 A.2d 1270 (1985) (an employer required 
a psychiatric examination only to harass an emotionally disturbed employee into· 
either suicide or abandoning her claim for worker's compensation); Moniodis v. 
Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (an employer transferred a dedicated, middle· 
aged employee with a preexisting nervous disorder, reducing her hours, and taking 
her company keys because she refused to take a polygraph test), cert. denied, 304 
Md. 631, 500 A.2d 649 (1985). 
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Maryland, the physical injury is sufficient if it is "capable of objective 
determination"48 based upon "symptoms clearly indicative of a resultant 
pathological, physiological, or mental state."49 Although defined in dif-
ferent terms, physiCal injury capable of objective determination resembles 
severe emotional distress as determined by Maryland courts. 50 
In Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,51 the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland held that the plaintiff's proof was insufficient to justify 
recovery on the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause the defendant's conduct was not extreme and outrageous and the 
plaintiff's emotional distress was not severe. 52 In finding that the de-
fendant's conduct was not extreme and outrageous, the court recognized 
that "[c]reditors have the right to insist on payment of just debts and 
may threaten legal proceedings."53 Additionally, the court noted that 
48. Vance, 286 Md. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34; see a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
ToRTS§ 436 (1965) (bodily hann caused by the internal operation of fright or other 
emotional disturbance will suffice in a negligence action); Annotation, Right toRe-
cover for Emotional Disturbance or its Physical Consequences in the Absence of Im-
pact or Other Actionable Wrong, 674 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 100, § 9(b) (1984) 
(a definite nervous disorder is a physical injury that will support damages in a negli-
gence action). 
49. Vance, 286 Md. at 500, 408 A.2d at 733-34 (quoting Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 
397, 402, 165 A. 182, 184 (1933)). 
50. Compare cases involving physical injury capable of objective determination: Vance, 
286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (experiencing symptoms of an ulcer, functioning abnor-
mally, suffering insomnia, embarassment, emotional collapse, and depression mani-
festing itself in unkept hair, sunken cheeks, and dark eyes); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 
Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (suffering nervousness and physical injuries coupled 
with shock and mental anguish); Bowman, 164 Md. at 402, 165 A. at 184 (becoming 
hysterical, bedridden for two weeks, and unable to work for six months); Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931) (suffering excru-
ciating pain, mental anguish, and becoming a "nervous wreck"); Green v. T.A. 
Shoemaker, 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909) (suffering a nervous disorder that pre-
vents employment); with cases involving severe emotional distress: Moniodis v. 
Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 16, 494 A.2d 212, 219-20 (1985) (becoming reclusive and no 
longer able to perform household chores); Vance v. Vance, 41 Md. App. 130, 137, 
396 A.2d 296, 301 (suffering "nervousness, spontaneous crying, hollowed appear-
ance, and an inability to relate to the present"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 286 
Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979). 
51. 66 Md. App. 46, 502 A.2d 1057 (1986). 
52. Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 66 Md. App. 46, 59, 502 A.2d 1057, 1064, cert. 
denied, 306 Md. 118, 507 A.2d 631 (1986). The court, however, also held that 
punitive damages were recoverable under the plaintiff's claim for conversion be-
cause the defendant's conduct met the criterion for actual malice. ld. at 65, 502 
A.2d at 1067. In finding that the defendant's behavior was sufficiently culpable to 
meet the malice test for punitive damages, but insufficiently culpable to meet the 
extreme and outrageous test for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court 
implicitly held that actual malice does not elevate wrongful conduct to an extreme 
and outrageous level. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
53. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 61, 502 A.2d at 1064; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 46 comment g (1965) (conduct that otherwise would be extreme and outra-
geous may be privileged under some circumstances). Although the setting of the 
conduct is a factor in measuring its outrageousness, the setting also may mitigate 
what otherwise would be extreme and outrageous conduct. 
The Hamilton court also identified the similarity between the debtor-creditor 
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the plaintiff "did not meekly endure the telephone calls but responded in 
a hostile fashion herself ... !'54 In finding that the plaintiff's emotional 
distress was not severe, the court stated, "Although [the plaintiff's] dis-
tress was keen and apparently genuine, it was not disabling. Her ego was 
bruised and her dignity was bent, but neither was destroyed."55 The 
court explained that "recovery [for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress] will be meted out sparingly, its balm reserved for those wounds 
that are truly severe and incapable of healing themselves."56 
The court also held that the tort of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is not recognized in Maryland.57 The tort is unnecessary, the 
court reasoned, because a plaintiff could recover under either a tort ac-
tion for intentional infliction of emotional distress if the defendant's neg-
ligence is so extreme and outrageous as to indicate recklessness, or a 
"tort action for emotional distress arising out of negligent conduct" if the 
emotional distress is only a factor considered in measuring damages. 58 
The Hamilton reasoning indicates that the extreme and outrageous 
conduct necessary to satisfy an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
action must be unilateral. A combative behaviorial response by the 
plaintiff diminishes the legal impact of what otherwise would be extreme 
and outrageous conduct by the defendant because such a response is a 
contributing factor to the defendant's wrongful behavior. 59 Alterna-
tively, such a response may indicate that the plaintiff is not particularly 
susceptible to emotional distress. 60 Thus, proof that the defendant's con-
duct is extreme and outrageous depends not only ripon the defendant's 
conduct, but upon the plaintiff's conduct as well.61 
relationship and the employer-employee relationship. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 61, 
502 A.2d at 1065; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment e 
(1965). Compare Annotation, Recovery for Emotional Distress or its Physical Conse-
quences Caused by Attempts to Collect Debt Owed by Third Party, 46 A.L.R.3d 772 
(1972) with Annotation, Liability of Employer. Supervisor, or Manager for Intention-
ally or Recklessly Causing Employee Emotional Distress, 86 A.L.R.3d 454 (1978). 
54. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 60, 502 A.2d at 1064. The court noted that the plaintiff 
"did not meekly endure the telephone calls [of the creditor] but responded in a 
hostile fashion herself, speaking loudly and hanging up on occasion, generating ... 
'thrust and parry' .... " Id. (quoting Dick v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 
63 Md. App. 270, 492 A.2d 674 (1985)). 
55. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 61, 502 A.2d at 1064-65. 
56. Id. at 61, 502 A.2d at 1065 (emphasis added). 
57. Id. at 62-63, 502 A.2d at 1065 (citing Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 501 n.4, 408 
A.2d 728, 734 n.4 (1979)). The court also stated, "Neither this court nor the Court 
of Appeals ever suggested that Maryland recognizes or should establish such a 
tort." Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 62, 502 A.2d at 1065. But see supra note 39. 
58. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 63-64, 502 A.2d at 1066. 
59. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 22, at 612-13 ("The courts seem disinclined to 
make fine distinctions and are not concerned with who started the verbal barrage or 
in comparative opprobrium. If people will call each other names, they can hardly 
expect a court to determine the winner and give solace to his victim."). 
60. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
61. The behaviorial response by the plaintiff, however, is irrelevant in determining 
whether the emotional distress suffered is severe because the severity of the emo-
tional distress is measured objectively by what a person "of ordinary sensibilities 
164 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 16 
Hamilton expressly limits the type of injury that is recoverable 
under an intentional infliction of emotional distress action by requiring 
proof that the plaintifrs emotional distress be "incapable of healing it-
self. " 62 Whether an inability to function or tend to necessary matters, as 
required by prior decisions,63 constitutes emotional distress incapable of 
healing itself is uncertain. Nevertheless, based upon Hamilton, plaintiffs 
who are unable to attend to necessary matters owing to emotional dis-
tress may be unable to recover because such disabilities ultimately might 
heal over time without the need for medical or psychiatric intervention. 64 
In Hamilton, the court acknowledged that the plaintifrs emotional dis-
tress was genuine, but denied recovery because the injury was capable of 
healing itself. Implicitly, the court recognized that society's need to deter 
trivial litigation outweighs the individual's right to recover for an injury 
that, although genuine, would heal itself over time. 
Hamilton is perhaps most significant for its confirmation of Mary-
land's nonrecognition of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.65 The court reasoned that negligently inflicted emotional distress 
without further corroboration is recoverable only where the negligence is 
so extreme and outrageous as to indicate recklessness, thus warranting 
recovery under intentional infliction of emotional distress. 66 This reason-
ing adequately distinguishes the difference between the requisite conduct 
for a negligence action and an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
action. Implicitly, this reasoning also distinguishes the difference be-
tween the requisite injury for each cause of action67 and clarifies the 
extreme nature of the emotional distress necessary to satisfy a negligence 
would undergo under the circumstances." See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, 
at 63. 
62. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 61, 502 A.2d at 1065. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
64. But see Vance, 286 Md. at 502-03, 408 A.2d at 734-35 (medical expert testimony is 
unnecessary where there is an insignificant temporal lapse between the defendant's 
negligent conduct and the plaintiff's physical injury). 
65. Accord Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 501 n.4, 408 A.2d 728, 734 n.4 (1979). The 
Committee on Civil Pattern Jury Instructions cited several cases suggesting that 
negligent infliction of emotional distress is a cause of action in Maryland. See Mary-
land Civil Pattern Jury Instructions 19:7 (2d ed. 1984) ("A person who negligently 
causes severe mental distress to another may be held responsible."). The Hamilton 
court characterized this instruction as "misleading." Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 62, 
502 A.2d at 1065. Vance also is cited erroneously as permitting an ordinary negli-
gence action for the infliction of emotional distress without proof of a physical in-
jury. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 11, at 364 n.59. Although Vance and the 
cases cited by the Committee on Civil Pattern Jury Instructions did involve negli-
gent conduct that caused emotional distress, recovery was permitted only because 
the emotional distress resulted in a physical injury capable of objective determina-
tion. See cases cited supra note 50. 
66. Hamilton, 66 Md. App. at 63, 502 A.2d at 1065-66. 
67. For negligence, the emotional distress must result in a physical injury capable of 
objective determination. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. For intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, the emotional distress must be severe. See supra text 
accompanying notes 27-34. 
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action. Courts are more willing to impose liability where the defendant 
acts with a high degree of moral fault. 68 Conversely, the less culpable the 
defendant's conduct, the more extreme the plaintiff's injury need be to 
constitute a cause of action. Negligence is less culpable than extreme and 
outrageous recklessness;69 therefore, injury caused by negligence should 
be more extreme than injury caused by extreme and outrageous reckless-
ness. As a consequence, emotional distress resulting in physical injury 
capable of objective determination is more extreme than severe emotional 
distress and should be sufficient to satisfy an action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 
Hamilton narrowly defines the legal protection for emotional dis-
tress. The severity of the emotional distress necessary to warrant recov-
ery depends upon the culpability of the defendant's conduct. If the 
defendant's act is intentional or reckless, the defendant's conduct must 
be unilaterally extreme and outrageous, and the plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress must require medical treatment. If the defendant's act is merely 
negligent, the defendant's conduct need not be extreme and outrageous, 
but the plaintiff's emotional distress must require medical treatment and 
manifest itself in a physical injury capable of objective determination. 
Reflecting the judiciary's continued concern that trivial and fictitious 
claims persist in actions based upon emotional distress,70 Hamilton limits 
the scope of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
clarifies the scope of liability for negligence. 
Neal C Baroody 
68. See Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. 
REV. 874, 878 (1939) (citing Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault Affecting Defend-
ant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586 (1934)). 
69. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (defining negligence) 
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 500 (1965) (defining recklessness). In 
Maryland, however, conduct considered negligent and conduct considered extreme 
and outrageous are apparently the same. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
70. See Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977). 
